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Is There Complementarity or Substitutability between Internal and External 
R&D Strategies? 
 
 
 
Abstract  
The mixed picture of extant research on the relationship between internal and external R&D 
prompts us to ask such a question: under what conditions is there complementarity or 
substitutability between different R&D strategies? The goal of this paper is to contribute to the 
empirical literature by advancing and testing the contingency of the relationship between internal 
and external R&D strategies in shaping firms‘ innovative output. Using a panel sample of 
incumbent pharmaceutical firms covering the period 1986−2000, our empirical analysis suggests 
that the level of in-house R&D investments, which is characterized by decreasing marginal 
returns, is a contingency variable that critically influences the nature of the link between internal 
and external R&D strategies. In particular, internal R&D and external R&D, through either R&D 
alliances or R&D acquisitions, turn out to be complementary innovation activities at higher levels 
of in-house R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts internal and 
external R&D are substitutive strategic options. These findings are robust to alternative 
specifications and estimation techniques, including a dynamic perspective on firm innovative 
performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability of firms to continually update their technological know-how and capabilities is 
becoming an imperative for competitive survival (Christensen, 2000; Foster and Kaplan, 2001). 
In that context, firms can pursue multiple approaches to innovative renewal. One path is to 
develop and nurture in-house research and development (R&D) competencies. In technology-
based industries, perhaps the most salient mechanism of firms‘ innovative renewal is investing in 
internal R&D (Knott and Posen, 2009). Another path is found in the use of external technology 
sourcing. Powell et al. (1998, 1996) point out that in industries characterized by complex and 
rapidly expanding knowledge bases, the locus of innovative renewal lies within a broad 
‗network‘ of learning rather than within the boundaries of individual firms (see also Breschi and 
Malerba, 1997; Edquist, 1997). As a consequence, incumbent firms frequently need to leverage 
their external networks to source new technology and capabilities, especially within an emerging, 
new technological regime (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Kranenburg and Hagedoorn, 2008; Nicholls-
Nixon and Woo, 2003; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). 
          Recent years have witnessed more and more companies pursuing an ‗open innovation‘ 
(Chesbrough, 2003) strategy by leveraging internal and external knowledge flows in parallel to 
build and hone their innovative capabilities. Concurrent with the open innovation approach, a 
rather voluminous literature has emerged that examines the relationship between in-house R&D 
and external technology sourcing. At the heart of this literature is the discussion of the 
complementarity or substitutability between internal and external R&D strategies for managing 
innovation, a debate that has been accompanied by mixed empirical evidence
1
. On the one hand, 
                                                 
1 The study of complementarity between activities can be traced back to the theory of supermodularity (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990, 1995). Complementarity implies that adding one activity while the other is already being performed 
will result in higher incremental innovative performance than when adding the activity in isolation, whereas 
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a diverse set of studies demonstrate that internal R&D and external technology sourcing are 
complementary innovation activities, suggesting the interrelatedness of internal and external 
R&D in improving innovative performance (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Caloghirou et al., 2004; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Schmiedeberg, 2008; Tripsas, 1997; Tsai 
and Wang, 2008; Veugelers, 1997). And on the other, a host of empirical work identifying the 
linkage between internal and external sources of innovation have found substitutability instead 
(Audretsch et al., 1996; Blonigen and Taylor, 2000; Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006; Watkins and Paff, 2009). The above mixed picture of extant research on the 
relationship between internal and external R&D prompts us to ask the question: under what 
conditions is there complementarity or substitutability between different R&D strategies? The 
goal of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature by advancing and testing the 
contingency of the relationship between internal and external R&D strategies in shaping firms‘ 
innovative output.  
          Our study focuses on the global pharmaceutical industry as it provides an ideal setting for 
us to explore how incumbent firms organize R&D strategies in their quest for innovation within a 
new biotechnology-based technological regime. Using a panel sample of 83 incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms covering the period 1986–2000, our empirical analysis suggests that the 
level of in-house R&D investments, which is characterized by decreasing marginal returns, is a 
contingency variable that critically influences the nature of the link between internal and external 
R&D strategies. In particular, internal R&D and external R&D, through either R&D alliances or 
R&D acquisitions, turn out to be complementary innovation activities at higher levels of in-house 
                                                                                                                                                              
substitutability refers to the case in which adding one activity can actually decrease the marginal or incremental 
innovative performance of other activities (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Mohnen and Röller, 2005).  
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R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts internal and external R&D 
are substitutive strategic options. 
          The paper proceeds as follows. After an overview of the growing literature on internal and 
external R&D strategies of firms, we formulate the hypotheses to be tested. We then turn to 
methodology, describing the sample, the model, and the estimation techniques. The empirical 
results are presented in the next section, followed by a variety of robustness tests. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the results and some implications for future research.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To the extent that R&D is an important, and perhaps even the most important, contributor to 
productivity growth and innovation (Griliches, 1979; Scherer, 1982), the impact of R&D 
investments on firm innovation has attracted enormous attention in the literature. In their seminal 
work on the R&D-patents relationship, Hausman et al. (1984) maintain that, rather than the 
propensity to patent just declining exogenously over time, firms are getting less patents from their 
more recent R&D investments, implying a decline in the ‗effectiveness‘or productivity of R&D. 
The role of R&D in patenting, as a major indicator of innovation, has later on been studied 
extensively (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; Guo and 
Trivedi, 2002; Montalvo, 1997), with the overall R&D elasticity of patents varying from 0.4 to 
0.7 and thereby suggesting decreasing returns to scale (Gurmu and Perez-Sebastian, 2007).  
          Amongst others, Griliches (1990) suggests that the estimates for R&D elasticity vary and 
depend on firm size, with larger firms showing a lower R&D productivity
2
 (see also Acs and 
Audretsch, 1991). In line with this thinking, Graves and Langowitz (1993) show that firms in the 
                                                 
2 Griliches (1990) also points to the possibility of a reverse causality from R&D to patents in the knowledge 
production function.  Consequently, R&D is unlikely to be strictly exogenous. 
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pharmaceutical industry experience decreasing returns to scale in R&D as the level of their R&D 
expenditures rises. Their central argument is that innovative effectiveness decreases with 
increasing firm R&D investments and, by association, with firm size. Cohen and Klepper (1996) 
explain why larger firms can still prosper despite the lower average productivity of their R&D, as 
the greater output over which large firms can apply their R&D enables them to profit more from 
R&D than smaller firms, which leads them to undertake more R&D projects at the margin. A 
large number of recent studies examine the impact of firm R&D investments on innovation as 
well (e.g., Griffith et al., 2004; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Lokshin et al., 2008; Love and 
Roper, 2002; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007) and find diseconomies of scale in R&D in most cases. 
The above leads us to a baseline hypothesis on the effect of internal R&D on innovative output, 
which is to be seen as a starting point for our analysis of the simultaneous interactions between 
different R&D strategies. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There are decreasing returns to scale in internal R&D. Firm innovative output 
initially increases with investment in internal R&D, this rate of increase diminishes at higher 
levels of internal R&D investments though. 
 
          Openness of firms to external knowledge sources is another key element for knowledge 
creation and innovation (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A diverse 
set of studies emphasize that access to external R&D can be leveraged to enhance the efficiency 
of internal R&D investments. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) demonstrate that firms that leverage 
external technology sourcing as a complement to internal R&D investments in order to probe and 
access cutting-edge knowledge are most successful in their new product introductions. Tripsas 
(1997) finds, while studying the continued survival of incumbent firms when confronted with 
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radical technical change, that a combination of internal R&D and external technology sourcing 
through alliances positively reinforces firms‘ innovative output3. In a similar fashion, Caloghirou 
et al. (2004) show the parallel positive role of internal R&D capabilities and their interaction with 
external sources of knowledge in raising innovative performance. Focusing on the choice 
between make or buy decision by firms, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) find that internal R&D 
and external knowledge acquisition are complementary innovation activities. The moderating 
effect of internal R&D is also emphasized by Tsai and Wang (2008). Their findings suggest that 
the contribution of external technology acquisition to firm performance increases with the level 
of internal R&D efforts
4
. In their dynamic panel study of Dutch manufacturing firms, Lokshin et 
al. (2008) also find that combing internal and external R&D significantly contributes to 
productivity growth, with a positive impact of external R&D only evident in case of sufficient 
internal R&D. 
          However, a number of other papers identifying the relationship between in-house and 
external sources of innovation have found a substitutability instead of a complementarity effect. 
Audretsch et al. (1996) suggest that internal and external R&D are substitutes in low-technology 
industries but not in high-technology industries. Blonigen and Taylor (2000) find a substantial 
inverse relationship between R&D intensity and acquisition activities among electronic and 
electrical equipment firms. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) demonstrate that firms that are 
experiencing deterioration in internal R&D productivity are more likely to engage in technology 
acquisitions, implying that firms may pursue one mode of innovation to compensate for their 
ineffectiveness in another mode. In their investigation into the role of firm openness in explaining 
                                                 
3 Also see the study by Schmiedeberg (2008), who provides further evidence for significant complementarities 
between internal R&D and R&D cooperation, but casts doubts on the complementarity between internal and 
contracted R&D. 
4 This is consistent with the findings by Veugelers (1997) who shows that external knowledge sources stimulate the 
innovative productivity of internal research activities at lease for firms with internal R&D departments.  
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innovative performance, Laursen and Salter (2006) report evidence of a substitution effect 
between internal R&D and external search strategies. Consistent with previous studies, 
mentioned in the above, though in a rather different research context, Watkins and Paff (2009) 
find a substitute relationship between in-house R&D and external basic research when the 
relative tax prices of each category of research change
5
.  
          By and large, these various strands of the empirical literature indicate the inconclusive 
nature of the debate about the complementarity or substitutability between internal and external 
R&D strategies in shaping firms‘ innovative performance. We therefore are faced with two 
opposing hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 2-a:  Internal and external R&D strategies complement each other and hence 
increase a firm’s innovative output. 
Hypothesis 2-b:  Internal and external R&D strategies substitute for each other and hence 
decrease a firm’s innovative output.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Setting 
The research setting for testing our hypotheses is the global pharmaceutical industry, which is on 
the verge of profound mutations as a new biotechnology-based technological regime has emerged. 
More in particular, we will focus on incumbent pharmaceutical companies attempting to build up 
innovative capabilities within this new technological regime. Incumbent pharmaceutical firms are 
defined as pharmaceutical firms that were in existence prior to the emergence of biotechnology. 
                                                 
5 R&D policies such as R&D grants, subsidies, and tax incentives often treat different types of R&D differently, 
which tends to affect the composition of firms‘ R&D budgets (Watkins and Paff, 2009).  See similar studies by 
Cappelen et al. (2008), Czarnitzki  et al. (2004), Parsons and Phillips (2007).  
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These companies, such as Bayer, Hoffmann-La Roche, Merck, and Pfizer, are generally mature 
and very large firms that dominated the industry since the 1940s. Since the mid 1970s, new 
biotechnology brought along significant scientific and technological breakthroughs in genetic 
engineering (recombinant DNA, 1973) and hybridization (monoclonal antibodies, 1975). These 
advances have served as a radical process innovation for established pharmaceutical companies 
in the way new drugs are discovered and developed (Pisano, 1997) and they are even to affect the 
core capabilities needed to remain competitive (Nagarajan and Mitchell, 1998). This development 
provides an ideal setting for us to explore how incumbents organize R&D strategies in their quest 
for innovation within a new technological regime.  
 
Data and Sample  
We use data from several major sources. (1) The source for the patent data is the Technology 
Profile Report maintained by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), an agency of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. We obtained detailed data comprising the complete set of all 
biotechnology patents granted to global pharmaceutical firms annually since the emergence of 
biotechnology
6
. (2) The MERIT-CATI database, which is developed and maintained by 
researchers at the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology 
(MERIT). The CATI (Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators) database documents 
                                                 
6 The complete set of biotechnology patents refers to the biotechnology patents, as identified by the USPTO, in the 
following patent classes: 424 [Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions (424/9.1-424/9.2, 424/9.34-
424/9.81, 424/85.1-424/94.67, 424/130.1-424/283.1, 424/520-424/583, 424/800-424/832) ], 435 [Chemistry: 
Molecular biology and microbiology (435/1.1-435/7.95, 435/40.5-435/261, 435/317.1-435/975) ], 436 [Chemistry: 
Analytical and immunological testing (436/500-436/829) ], 514  [Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions 
(514/2-514/22, 514/44, 514/783) ], 530 [Chemistry: Natural resins or derivatives; peptides or proteins; lignins or 
reaction products thereof (530/300-530/427, 530/800-530/868) ], 536 [Organic compounds (536/1.11-536/23.74, 
536/25.1-536/25.2) ], 800 [Multi-cellular living organisms and unmodified parts thereof and related processes], 930 
[Peptide or protein sequence], PLT [Plants].  
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technological partnerships
7
 in multiple industries around the globe. In this study we specifically 
focused on R&D alliances between established pharmaceutical companies and new 
biotechnology ventures. (3) The SDC (Securities Database Corporation) Platinum of Thomson 
Financial is used for data on R&D acquisitions of new biotechnology companies by incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms. This database contains information on the year of acquisition, details on 
the (parent) acquirer and the (parent) target, and a brief description of the acquisition transaction. 
(4) Financial data were cross-tracked through Compustat and Datastream (Thomson Financial). 
All financial data were converted to U.S. dollars and inflation-adjusted. 
          To mitigate a potential survivor bias, we started with a comprehensive set of global 
pharmaceutical firms alive in 1986 according to various industry sources
8
. In this manner we 
identified 89 incumbent pharmaceutical firms, defined as pharmaceutical firms that were in 
existence prior to the emergence of biotechnology in the mid 1970s. We then proceeded with a 
family tree analysis
9
 on each of the 89 firms for the 1986–2000 time period. Through this 
analytical process, 6 horizontal mergers and acquisitions were ascertained among the incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms. As a horizontal merger or acquisition took place, we added to the survivor 
the historical data of the acquired company (i.e. the inactive) and then tracked the surviving entity 
forward
10
. Such scrutiny procedure ultimately renders a slightly unbalanced panel sample of 83 
firms covering the 15-year period from 1986 to 2000 (i.e., 1139 firm-year observations).  
                                                 
7 CATI only collects cooperative agreements in which a combined innovative activity or an exchange of technology 
is engaged by at least two industrial partners. The first phase of data collection is described in Hagedoorn (1993), 
Duysters and Hagedoorn (1993).  
8 To draw the sample for this study we tracked Compustat, Datastream, Amadeus, SIC reports, Ernst and Young‘s 
Annual Biotech Industry Reports, Scrip‘s Pharmaceutical Yearbook, amongst others. 
9 For the rationale for constructing family trees, see Rothaermel and Hess (2007). When firms were acquired by 
outsiders, they were included as unbalanced data. A variety of industry sources were checked throughout the family 
tree analysis, including Compustat/Standard and Poor‘s, Encyclopedia, and company homepage.  
10 In Compustat, the treatment of mergers and acquisitions seeks to preserve historical company data for the 
acquiring company whenever possible. It is rare that a new company is added as a result of a merger. There are 
usually no changes to the surviving company‘s company-level identifiers, whereas the acquired company 
subsequently becomes inactive in the database the month following the merger or acquisition. Two basic accounting 
11 
 
          It is important to indicate that while we collected patent data until the end of 2003, we 
purposefully ended the study in 2000 to overcome a potential right truncation bias. This measure 
was taken in that all patent data used in the study are based upon patent applications granted, and 
the application date is only reported when the patent is actually granted. A grant lag as such is 
generally three years after the patent was originally applied for
11
 (Biotechnology Industry 
Organization, 2008). In contrast, there is essentially no lag time between the completed invention 
and the patent application date, which is on average no more than three months (Darby and 
Zucker, 2003). Thus, the application date of a granted patent is closely tied to the timing of the 
new knowledge creation and should be used as the relevant time placer for patents (Hall et al., 
2001; Trajtenberg, 1990).  
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable  
    Innovative Output We focus on the patenting frequency, i.e., the number of annual 
biotechnology patents (Biotech Patents) granted to incumbent pharmaceutical firms to proxy for 
their innovative output within the new technological regime. Annual patent counts are generally 
accepted as one of the most appropriate indicators that enable researchers to compare the 
inventive or innovative output of companies in terms of new technologies, new processes, and 
new products (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). Patents are directly related to inventiveness 
                                                                                                                                                              
methods are used to account for mergers and acquisitions, the ―purchase method‖ and the ―pooling of interest 
method‖. In this study we principally followed the ―purchase method‖ since this is the way that the majority of 
mergers and acquisitions are accounted for. In June 2001 the Financial Accounting Standard Board eliminated the 
―pooling of interest‖ and requires that all business combinations be accounted for by the ―purchase method‖ (FASB 
Statement 141).  
11 The USPTO evaluates patent applications and grants patents. Patents usually last 20 years from the date on which 
the patent application is filed (not when it is issued). Thus, the enforceable term of a patent is between 17 and 20 
years; exactly how long depends on how long the application is under PTO review (i.e., the grant lag). The PTO 
provides a three-year period for the agency to issue a patent.  
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(Walker, 1995), and represent an externally validated measure of technological novelty (Griliches, 
1990). Studies also show that patents are well-correlated with other indicators of innovative 
output (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Stuart, 2000).  
 
Independent Variables 
     Internal R&D We measure a pharmaceutical company‘s internal R&D investments by its 
R&D expenditures. As highlighted in prior research, R&D expenditures are primarily taken as an 
input indicator of a firm‘s efforts in establishing R&D that might eventually lead to innovative 
output (Griliches, 1990, 1998; Hitt et al., 1997). R&D efforts can also signal innovative 
competences that are found to affect the performance of companies, particularly in high-
technology industries (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2001; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). To 
accurately identify the magnitude of in-house R&D investments by the global pharmaceuticals, 
we excluded in-process R&D spending
12
, which is subsumed within R&D expense in the 
Compustat database. Meanwhile, the quadratic terms of internal R&D, R&D expenditures 
squared, are enclosed in the regression analysis as a test for decreasing returns to scale in R&D
13
 
(Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; 
Graves and Langowitz, 1993; Griffith et al., 2004; Griliches, 1990; Guo and Trivedi, 2002; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Hall et al., 1986; Hausman et al., 1984; Lokshin et al., 2008; 
Montalvo, 1997; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). 
                                                 
12 Acquisition-related in-process R&D charges are defined in Compustat as the portion of R&D considered to be 
‗purchased‘ and written off immediately upon acquisition if the R&D items are deemed not to have an alternative use.  
13 Exclusion of the quadratic terms is nontrivial as in the presence of declining returns to scale in R&D one may 
expect firms to avoid this by combing internal and external R&D strategies (Lokshin et al., 2008).  
13 
 
     External R&D We include a dummy variable, rather than a count measure
14
, indicating 
whether or not a pharmaceutical firm pursued external R&D strategies. This dummy variable 
takes on the value of 1 if the company sourced R&D externally through either R&D alliances or 
R&D acquisitions (1 = R&D sourced externally through R&D alliances/R&D acquisitions), and 
0 if the company solely undertook internal R&D. We identified R&D alliances through a detailed 
content analysis of each and every alliance the pharmaceutical firms entered since 1986 in 
biotechnology, 3,362 alliances in total, of which 1,205 alliances pertained to a clear R&D 
component. Likewise, we focused merely on R&D acquisitions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Higgins 
and Rodriguez, 2006), for which the business description in SDC Platinum suggested that the 
acquired biotechnology company was indeed targeted for its R&D capabilities. Through this 
process, 638 R&D acquisitions were found for the study period 1986–2000.  
 
Control Variables 
     Presample Innovation In all models we attempted to capture the unobserved heterogeneity in 
firm innovation. As stressed by Blundell et al. (1995), the ‗permanent‘ capabilities of companies 
to successfully commercialize new products and processes should be reflected in the pre-sample 
history of innovative output. Hence, we included both the pre-sample average patent count (i.e., 
the average number of biotech patents by the firm in the period from 1974
15
 to 1985) and a 
dummy (1 = if the firm had ever innovated prior to 1986)
16
 to proxy for the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the innovation models of incumbent pharmaceutical firms (Blundell et al., 1995; 
Blundell et al., 2002).  
                                                 
14 See Ahuja and Katila (2001), a simple count measure could possibly lead to measurement concerns. Instead of 
considering the scale of external R&D activities, we focus on whether firms use external R&D or not. The average of 
this dummy variable is 0.43. 
15 Due to the emergence of the new biotechnology in the mid 1970s.  
16 The dummy variable captures the fact that firms who sometimes innovate may be qualitatively different from those 
who never innovate (Blundell et al., 1995).  
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     Firm Merged The global pharmaceutical industry has witnessed a continuing trend of 
consolidation and concentration, especially in the late 1990s. To account for horizontal mergers 
and acquisitions among sample firms, as previously mentioned in the data section, we pursued a 
detailed family tree analysis by tracing all incumbent pharmaceutical firms back to their 
forerunners alive in 1986. Along with this analytical approach, we explicitly inserted a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not the sample firm was the outcome of a horizontal merger or 
acquisition over the study period 1986–2000 (1 = Firm Merged).  
     Pharmaceutical Firm The global pharmaceutical industry is made up of both specialized 
pharmaceutical firms and more diversified, mainly chemical, conglomerates. A firm‘s level of 
diversification indicates its previous experience in entering new businesses (Chang and Singh, 
1999; Yip, 1982), which is likely to influence to what extent it attempts to innovate within the 
new biotechnology regime. Therefore, we controlled for a firm‘s degree of diversification by 
coding a firm as 1 if it is a specialized company (1 = Pharma Firm), and 0 otherwise. Specialized 
pharmaceutical companies are those firms that are active in SIC 2834 (Pharmaceutical 
Preparations Manufacturing), whereas a conglomerate might engage, for instance, in both SIC 
2834 and SIC 2890 (Chemical Products Manufacturing). About one half of the firms are fully 
specialized (45%).  
     Firm Nationality To control for country-specific institutional configurations that are 
significant in shaping patenting propensities (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999) as well as internal and 
external R&D strategies, we included two indicator variables based upon the location of company 
headquarters. One indicator variable is coded as 1 if the pharmaceutical firm is located in the 
United States (1 = U.S. Firm); the other indicator is coded as 1 if the pharmaceutical firm is 
headquartered in Europe (1 = European Firm), with a Japanese location as the reference category. 
15 
 
The global nature of our dataset is reflected in the fact that 36% of the firms are U.S. based, 28% 
are European based, with the remaining 36% headquartered in Japan.  
     Firm Size Previous work has examined how factors associated with firm size impact on a 
firm‘s incentive to invest in R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Schumpeter, 1942; Teece, 1982, 
1992). Moreover, firm size has been shown to exert a direct effect on innovative output (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1988; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Freeman and Soete, 1997). Researchers also observe 
that small firms are more likely to restrict themselves to a simple innovation strategy, whereas 
large firms tend to combine various R&D sources (Beneito, 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 
1999). We thus controlled for firm size by taking into account the total number of employees 
(Employees). The average number of employees of individual firms is 28,970, suggestive of their 
large size. 
     Firm Performance Previous research suggests that there is a trade-off between the size of a 
firm and its performance (Cubbin and Leech, 1986; Dobson and Gerrard, 1989; Reid, 1993, 
1995). Companies with higher performance may as well be better positioned to finance their 
R&D investments. These influences were captured by including Net Income and Total Revenues
17
 
in the regression analysis to allow for financial status of large pharmaceutical companies.  
     Year Fixed Effects In order to control for factors other than firm-specific characteristics that 
may influence all firms, such as economic-wide changes, we inserted year dummies, with 2000 
being the reference year.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Total revenue is a measure of firm size as well and might account for firm size speedily increased through 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions. Besides, control for firm revenue is necessary for isolating the effect of R&D 
expenditures on innovative output (Rothaermel and Hess, 2007). 
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Estimation Technique 
The dependent variable of this study, innovative output, as measured by biotech patent counts, is 
a count variable taking only non-negative integer values. To model count data the linear 
exponential or log-link family is a good alternative (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). On account of 
the overdispersion phenomenon displayed by patent counts, namely the preponderance of zero 
and small values of firm patenting, the negative binomial estimation provides a better fit for the 
data than the more restrictive Poisson model (Hausman et al., 1984). 
          The common first moment condition for the negative binomial model is,   
                                                                                                            (1)                                                                                               
In our innovation model, we write as 
 
 
                                                                         (2) 
 
where λit is the expectation value of biotech patent counts for firm i in period t, RDI and RDI
2
 are 
R&D expenditures and R&D expenditures squared, respectively, RDE represents the dummy 
variable of external R&D through R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions, Controln is a vector of 
control variables, and the parameters β, θ, γ are coefficients of various explanatory variables. A 
one-period lag is employed on all explanatory (key and control) variables to alleviate a potential 
simultaneity bias.   
          Differentiating equation (1) with respect to RDI and dividing both sides of the resulting 
equation by λit yields,  
                                     (3)       
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The expected marginal innovative output is herein given by the relative change
18
 in λit associated 
with a one unit change in RDI. We then differentiate equation (3) with respect to RDI a second 
time,  
                     (4)                                                             
The above model explains the concavity of marginal returns to internal R&D, indicating whether 
there are decreasing returns (i.e., concave whenever or ) or increasing 
returns (i.e., convex whenever  or  ) to scale in internal R&D. Further, 
the existence of an interactive effect between RDI and RDE is defined by requiring that the 
relative change in λit associated with a change in RDI depends on RDE and vice versa 
(Winkelmann, 2008). Differencing equation (3) with respect to RDE, given a dummy variable of 
RDE, we obtain
19
,  
                           (5) 
Equation (5) clarifies the sense in which complementarity or substitutability between internal and 
external R&D strategies is contingent on the level of in-house R&D. RDI and RDE are considered 
(strict) complementary when the interactive effects are positive ( ), while 
RDI and RDE are considered (strict) substitutive when the interactive effects are negative 
( ).  
                                                 
18  See the interpretation of parameters in the Poisson regression by Winkelmann (2008, p.70).  
19
 Mullahy (1999) discusses the difficulties that arise if interactive effects in nonlinear models are defined in terms 
of absolute, rather than relative, changes. In our model the interactive effects under absolute change would be 
otherwise as complicated as follows,  
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          In our count panel data model, either fixed or random effects specification can, in theory, 
be used to control for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Greene, 2003). One difficulty with 
the random effects specification is its underlying assumption that time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with regressors of interest. In other words, this specification rules 
out the existence of time invariant unobserved factors that influence both a firm‘s R&D strategies 
and its innovative output, which is untenable since managers make their ‗strategic‘ organizational 
choices with certain performance expectations in mind (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Leiblein 
et al., 2002). Hence, we used the fixed-effects specification so as to estimate the model 
parameters consistently (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Winkelmann, 2008). Additionally, 
following Blundell et al. (1995, 2002), we allowed for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
by explicitly taking into account the pre-sample history of firm innovative output.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix. The table indicates a high 
degree of variance on most of the variables such as Biotech Patents, R&D Expenditures, 
Employees, and Presample Mean. The bivariate correlations are, with the exception of R&D 
expenditures and employees
20
, low and thereby indicate sound validity. Moreover, variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) were computed to assess the severity of multicollinearity. The average 
VIF value is 2.19, with the maximum VIF value of 5.29, which are well below the cut-off point 
                                                 
20 As mentioned previously, factors associated with firm size tend to influence a firm‘s incentive to invest in R&D 
(Cohen and Levin, 1989; Schumpeter, 1942; Teece, 1982, 1992). In addition, employees and total revenue, as close 
measures of firm size, are also highly correlated in our dataset (r = 0.80).  
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of 10 (Cohen et. al., 2003), implying that multicollinearity does not pose a problem for our 
estimation models.
21
 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
          Table 2 provides results for all models using fixed-effects negative binomial estimation. 
Model 1 is the baseline specification including the control variables only. Model 2 estimates 
R&D expenditures and the quadratic terms thereof. Model 3 presents the full model with the 
interactive effects between internal and external R&D. Each subsequent model demonstrates a 
significant (p < 0.001) improvement over the baseline specification. We use the full Model 3 to 
discuss the regression results of the hypothesis tests. Overall, the estimated coefficients suggest a 
curvilinear relationship between R&D expenditures and biotech patenting. The estimated second 
derivative, 2θ2 when RDE = 0 given by equation (4), is negative and statistically significant (p < 
0.001). By comparison, when RDE = 1, the estimated second derivative, 2θ2 + 2θ23 given by 
equation (4), becomes less negative (and significant at p < 0.10), implying that marginal returns 
to internal R&D decrease less in the presence of external R&D. Taken together, these results 
provide strong support for hypothesis 1 that there are decreasing returns to scale in internal R&D. 
Firm innovative output initially increases with investment in internal R&D, this rate of increase 
diminishes at higher levels of internal R&D spending though. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies clearly suggesting diseconomies of scale in internal R&D (Graves and 
                                                 
21 As an additional test, we centered the independent variables before creating their squares and cross products 
(Cohen, 2003). The estimated coefficients turned out to show a very similar empirical pattern. Besides, even if 
multicollinearity does not bias coefficient estimates, it may affect the stability of the estimated coefficients, thereby 
omitting even a few observations can change the sign or the significance of the affected variables (Greene, 2003). To 
ensure the robustness of our results, we performed a sensitivity analysis by drawing random samples of 90% of the 
total observations and estimating the full model for each of these random samples (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). The 
corresponding results are similar to the results reported below.  
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Langowitz, 1993; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Lokshin et al., 2008; Rothaermel and Hess, 
2007).  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
          In hypothesis 2, we postulated that internal and external R&D strategies may reinforce or 
substitute for each other in predicting firms‘ innovative output. We tested the interactive effect 
between internal and external R&D by examining the sign and statistical significance of the 
values of the cross-partial derivative,  given by equation (5). To this purpose, a 
graphical analysis, as exhibited in Figure 1, was conducted to manifest the nature and 
significance of the interactive effect by plotting its value and the implied z-statistic value over the 
range of internal R&D investments by incumbent pharmaceutical firms (Ai and Norton, 2003; 
Hoetker, 2007; Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). In Figure 1, the bullet symbols ( ● ) depict values of 
the interactive effect between internal and external R&D, recorded on the left axis, while the 
diamond shaped symbols ( ◊ ) depict z-statistic values, recorded on the right axis. As seen in 
Figure 1, the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the interactive effect varies with the 
level of in-house R&D. The interactive effect is negative and significant (p < 0.10) when internal 
R&D is less than 886.14, whereas the effect is positive and significant (p < 0.10) when internal 
R&D is in the range from about 1364.34 to 2689.31, with the interactive effect not statistically 
significant in between. These findings highlight the complexity of understanding the relationship 
between internal and external R&D strategies in shaping firms‘ innovative performance, and 
clear-cut results, either complementarity (hypothesis 2-a) or substitutability (hypothesis 2-b), are 
not always to be expected. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our overall findings suggest that a 
21 
 
complete picture is to be found in the contingency of the relationship between internal and 
external R&D strategies, where complementarity or substitutability is contingent on the level of 
in-house R&D. 
 
Insert Figure1 about here 
           
Turning to the effects of control variables, we found largely consistent results across 
various models. The pre-sample patent variables, i.e., pre-sample mean patent count and the 
dummy, are both positive and statistically significant, indicating that it is important to control for 
the unobserved differences in the innovative capabilities with which firms entered our sample. 
Employees, as a measure of firm size, are positively associated with patenting frequency (p < 
0.05). The implied gains from large horizontal merger or acquisition, however, have not been 
identified. Incumbent pharmaceutical companies that speedily expand through horizontal mergers 
and acquisitions appear to degrade their innovative output significantly (p < 0.001) over the study 
period.  The estimated coefficient of firm revenues is significant (p < 0.001) but, contrary to 
expectations, in a negative direction. With regard to the year fixed effects (included but not 
shown), the year dummies for 1993 – 1999 are positive and significant, while all the other 
calendar year indicators are not statistically significant, relative to the reference year 2000. These 
results suggest that patenting activity has significantly accelerated in the later sample period 
(1993 – 1999), in contrast with its earlier years (1986 – 1992). 
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Robustness of Results 
To ensure the robustness of our results presented above, we also ran models including a measure 
of firm knowledge stock
22
, effectively a lagged dependent variable, to partially control for firm-
specific unobserved heterogeneity that is not fixed throughout time (Blundell et al., 1995; 
Blundell et al., 2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Since the lagged dependent variable is 
predetermined, the conditional maximum likelihood estimator for count panel data models is 
inconsistent (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 2002; Crépon and Duguet, 1997; Montalvo, 
1997; Wooldridge, 1997). Following Blundell et al. (1995, 2002), we used the pre-sample mean 
(PSM) estimator
23
, which is a good alternative to standard estimators when there are 
predetermined regressors. The results under PSM estimation are reported in the first and third 
columns of Table 3. These estimated results set a very similar pattern as what we observed in 
Table 2. The additional message is that pharmaceutical firms with higher knowledge stock 
exhibit a significantly greater number of biotechnology patents (p < 0.001).  The strong effects of 
presample dummy and firm merged, though, are driven into insignificance in this dynamic 
analysis.  
          Furthermore, as our study focuses on a dummy, rather than a count, variable of external 
R&D, we disaggregate external R&D into R&D alliances and R&D acquisitions so as to capture 
the scale of different types of external R&D investments. The corresponding results are shown in 
the last two columns of Table 3. Both estimation methods — fixed-effects negative binomial and 
PSM — produce fairly close findings to those presented before. The robust empirical patterns 
overall suggest that the complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and R&D 
                                                 
22 See Blundell et al. (1995), knowledge stock (Kit) is the depreciated sum of past innovations and defined as, 
   Kit = Yit + (1– δ) Kit-1   where the depreciation rate δ is taken to be 30%, Yit is biotech patent in our models. 
23 Another alternative in the case of predetermined regressors is the quasi-differenced GMM estimator, which can 
however be severely biased in small samples, particularly when regressors are highly persistent and the instruments 
are therefore weak predictors of the endogenous variables in the differenced model (Blundell et al., 2002).  
23 
 
alliances, or between internal R&D and R&D acquisitions, is contingent on the level of in-house 
R&D investments. The only noteworthy difference between these two methods of estimation, 
fixed-effects negative binomial and PSM, is that R&D acquisitions exhibit more significant 
interactive effects with internal R&D under PSM estimation. In sum, these results corroborate our 
findings from the more parsimonious models of Table 2.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A substantial body of literature has examined the relationship between internal R&D and external 
technology sourcing through external R&D, so far focusing on either complementarity or 
substitutability. Yet there is still considerable confusion over the conditions under which there 
may in fact be complementarity or substitutability between different R&D strategies. Following 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), success in innovation will depend not only on combing various 
innovation activities, but also on creating the right context.
24
 The potential benefits from 
complementarity are therefore context-specific or contingent. One implication of our analysis is 
that the level of in-house R&D investments, which is characterized by decreasing marginal 
returns, is a contingency variable that critically influences the nature of the link between internal 
and external R&D strategies. In particular, internal R&D and external R&D, through R&D 
alliances or R&D acquisitions, are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of in-
house R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts internal and external 
R&D are substitutive strategic options. 
                                                 
24 In their study, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) identify reliance on more basic R&D, i.e., the use of universities 
and research centers as information sources for the innovation process, as an important context variable that affects 
the strength of the complementarity between innovation activities. 
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          In line with the two roles, or faces, of in-house R&D
25
 (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990), 
a minimum level of absorptive capacity, derived from in-house R&D activities, is required for 
effectively incorporating external R&D (Catozzella and Vivarelli, 2007; Lokshin et al., 2008; 
Tsai and Wang, 2008). Higher levels of internal R&D investments, as a consequence, may enable 
incumbent firms to maintain their ability to react adequately to technological changes by 
leveraging external networks. As Arora and Gambardella (1990) demonstrate in the context of 
pharma-biotechnology, large pharmaceutical firms with higher internal research activities are 
more active in using external knowledge sources. In this light, sufficient investments in in-house 
R&D contribute substantially to a spiral of success and thereby sustainable innovative 
capabilities. By contrast, at lower levels of in-house R&D investments, our findings point to the 
idea that the simultaneous pursuit of internal R&D and external R&D sourcing strategies would 
actually decrease a firm‘s innovative output, at least at the margin. Part of the explanation may lie 
in the fairly constrained resource set of firms, especially in terms of their absorptive capacity, as a 
firm may fail to reap economies of scope when ineffectively scanning, selecting, and assimilating 
external technological knowledge. Alternatively, incumbent firms with low research capabilities 
tend to exhibit overreliance on external R&D alliances or acquisitions for promising technologies 
in the face of radical technological change. This would explain, to a certain extent, why some 
established pharmaceutical firms are obtaining or choose to obtain their most technologically 
advanced projects from alliance partners or through the market for know-how. 
          In attempting to characterize the contingency of the relationship between internal and 
external R&D strategies in shaping firms‘ innovative output, a number of econometric problems 
arising from the count panel nature of the data have to be considered. In essence, we adopted an 
                                                 
25 As Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) point out, the two roles, or faces, of internal R&D are reflected in directly 
generating new knowledge and indirectly contributing to absorptive capacity.  
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estimation approach that places the simultaneous interactions between internal R&D and two 
alternative modes of external R&D investments, R&D alliances and R&D acquisitions
26
, at the 
core of our analysis. It is readily apparent that firms do not randomly choose a specific way to 
organize R&D, either rely exclusively on in-house R&D or systematically combine with R&D 
alliances and/or R&D acquisitions. The effects that drive firms to choose ex ante a specific R&D 
strategy towards superior performance outcomes
27
, when not corrected for, would introduce a 
serious endogeneity bias
28
 (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Leiblein et al., 2002). Possible 
remedies are available, nevertheless, if endogeneity is caused by time invariant correlated 
unobserved heterogeneity, for which one can estimate the model parameters consistently by fixed 
effects panel data methods (Winkelmann, 2008). Accordingly, we employed fixed effects 
specification in our panel count data models. In addition, to partially control for firm-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity that is not fixed throughout time (Blundell et al., 1995; Blundell et al., 
2002; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005), a dynamic analysis was performed by taking into account 
the measure of firm knowledge stock. 
          So far the inconsistent literature on the complementarity or substitutability between R&D 
strategies, as emphasized by Watkins and Paff (2009), leaves considerable room for improving 
the consistency in defining and measuring complementarity, particularly at the boundaries 
                                                 
26 In some cases large pharmaceutical firms also hope to establish a ‗preferential link‘ with the new biotechnology 
venture by acquiring part of its capital stocks. Such acquisition of minority stocks would likely translate into a formal 
alliance agreement once a specific new discovery needs to be implemented and possibly commercialized (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990). 
27 Understanding how firms choose ex ante a specific way to organize R&D is beyond the scope of our study. 
28 Another concern is the sample selection bias. A varied set of sample selection models are available in econometric 
literature to deal with such self-selection bias — the foremost model being Heckman two-stage approach. However, 
while Heckman and similar approaches are most commonly used within the domain of continuous-response models, 
they are not appropriate for count response models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Hilbe, 2007). The development of 
methodology in count panel data models to correct for sample selection bias is unfortunately still an open task 
(Winkelmann, 2008).  
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between disciplinary traditions
29
. The cloud of confusion over what is and what conditions 
complementarity thus suggests further research work to disentangle the rationales for combining 
different R&D sourcing arrangements. Moreover, there appears to be increasing variation among 
the largest pharmaceutical firms in terms of their strategies to extract value from new 
technologies, each trying to achieve a preferred balance between in-house R&D and externally 
sourced R&D. It may consequently no longer be useful to talk about Big Pharma as a 
homogenous sector (Mittra, 2007). An interesting avenue for future work would be to investigate 
these issues, for instance, through a fine-grained analysis of firm‘s optimal balance between 
internal and external R&D strategies at various stages of innovation process or towards different 
types of innovation. We believe that a fuller appreciation of the origins of innovativeness is to be 
found in a better understanding of the alignment between R&D strategies and the internal and 
external environment of firms, be it in either a high-technology or a low-technology industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 In the standard economic literature, partial substitution elasticity among inputs theoretically measures the relative 
change in the ratio of inputs when their relative prices change. By contrast, a very different measure is recently used 
in the management literature, comparing changes in average output ratios under different combinations of inputs. For 
the latter measure input prices play no role, nor do margins (Watkins and Paff, 2009).  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Matrix 
 
       
          Variable 
 
Mean S. D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 
 
Biotech Patents 7.60  14.42  0.00  207.00  1.00             
2 
 
R&D Expenditures (MM$) t-1
* 492.17  557.26  0.30  2869.31  0.38  1.00            
3 
 
R&D External t-1 0.43  0.50  0.00  1.00  0.27  0.33  1.00           
4 
 
Firm Merged t-1 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  0.31  0.34  0.17  1.00          
5 
 
European Firm t-1 0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00  0.09  0.21  0.01  0.14  1.00         
6 
 
US Firm t-1 0.36  0.48  0.00  1.00  0.09  0.19  0.14  -0.02  -0.46  1.00        
7 
 
Pharma Firm t-1 0.45  0.50  0.00  1.00  0.19  -0.06  0.21  0.22  -0.08  -0.06  1.00       
8 
 
Employees (1,000) t-1 28.97  32.99  0.32  173.00  0.18  0.77  0.14  0.15  0.28  0.25  -0.31  1.00      
9 
 
Net Income (MM$)  t-1
* 595.69  963.44  -6680.33  7948.49  0.28  0.69  0.23  0.16  0.05  0.33  -0.09  0.57  1.00     
10 
 
Revenues (MM$) t-1
*
 9377.54  10729.70  15.83  53885.29  0.07  0.61  0.03  0.03  0.21  0.21  -0.42  0.80  0.57  1.00    
11 
 
Presample Meant-1 3.64  5.73  0.00  27.38  0.56  0.40  0.29  0.45  -0.08  0.21  0.28  0.15  0.34  0.05  1.00   
12 
 
Presample Dummyt-1 0.91  0.29  0.00  1.00  0.04  -0.17  -0.12  -0.07  -0.28  0.09  -0.04  -0.13  -0.06  -0.01  0.20  1.00  
   
Notes: N = 1,139 firm-year observations. *In constant, inflation-adjusted year 2000 US $.                
 
 
Table 2 Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Biotech Patenting 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  0.1134 
(0.3374) 
-0.0927 
(0.3473) 
-0.2953 
(0.3545) 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Included Included Included 
Firm Merged t-1 -0.9764
*** 
(0.2746) 
-1.1353*** 
(0.2669) 
-1.1584*** 
(0.2650) 
European Firm t-1 -1.3036
*** 
(0.2726) 
-1.2720*** 
(0.2803) 
-1.2603*** 
(0.2828) 
US Firm t-1 -0.8015
** 
 (0.2764) 
-0.9207** 
(0.2854) 
-0.9156** 
(0.2865) 
Pharma Firm t-1  0.0839 
(0.2270) 
 -0.0305 
(0.2232) 
 0.0153 
(0.2236) 
Employees t-1  0.0166
*** 
(0.0034) 
 0.0076* 
(0.0039) 
 0.0079* 
(0.0038) 
Net Income t-1  1.49E-05 
(4.05E-05) 
-1.32E-05 
(3.90E-05) 
-1.40E-05 
(3.93E-05) 
Revenues t-1 -3.91E-05
** 
(1.25E-05) 
-4.77E-05*** 
(1.34E-05) 
-4.93E-05*** 
(1.32E-05) 
Presample Meant-1  0.0528
** 
(0.0161) 
 0.0291† 
(0.0171) 
 0.0321† 
(0.0176) 
Presample Dummy t-1  1.3161
*** 
(0.2733) 
 1.3288*** 
(0.2920) 
 1.3900*** 
(0.2911) 
R&D Expenditures t-1  
 1.70E-03*** 
(3.33E-04) 
 2.30E-03*** 
(3.81E-04) 
R&D Expenditures squared t-1  
-4.07E-07*** 
(1.14E-07) 
-6.99E-07*** 
(1.49E-07) 
R&D External t-1   
 0.2555* 
(0.0993) 
R&D Expenditures*R&D External t-1   
-9.36E-04** 
(2.82E-04) 
R&D Expenditures Squared*  
R&D External t-1 
  
 4.36E-07** 
(1.41E-07) 
 
N 1125 1125 1125 
 
Log Likelihood -2273.8789 -2258.3008 -2252.8549 
 
Chi Square 286.36*** 337.51*** 351.57*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are included but not shown. The fixed-effects 
specification eliminates firms who never patent, thereby reducing the effective sample to 1125 firm-year 
observations. Two tailed-tests significant at: 
† p<0.10 
* p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
*** p<0.001 
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Figure 1 Interactive Effects between Internal and External R&D  
Under Relative Change 
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Notes: z-statistic value (-1.645, 1.645), 10% two-tailed test. The solid symbols depict values of the 
interaction effect between internal and external R&D, recorded on the left axis, while the diamond shaped 
symbols depict z-statistic values, recorded on the right axis. The values of the interaction effect, as given by 
equation (5), range from -0.0009 to 0.0016, with a mean value of -0.0005; the z-statistic values range from 
-3.3142 to 2.8260, with a mean value of -2.3453. 
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Table 3 Robustness Test 
 
Variable 
 
External R&D (dummy)                 External R&D (count) 
    PSM Negative Binomial (FE)     PSM 
Constant 
 
 0.2136 
(0.4545) 
-0.1925 
(0.3504) 
 0.1899 
(0.4184) 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Included Included Included 
Firm Merged t-1 
 
-0.0527 
(0.1908) 
-1.1806*** 
(0.2712) 
-0.0431 
(0.1693) 
European Firm t-1 
 
 0.0996 
(0.247) 
-1.2490*** 
(0.2752) 
 0.0370 
(0.2322) 
US Firm t-1 
 
-0.1470 
(0.2339) 
-0.9321** 
(0.2807) 
-0.2045 
(0.2249) 
Pharma Firm t-1 
 
-0.0883 
(0.1932) 
-0.0282 
(0.2258) 
-0.1152 
(0.1870) 
Employees t-1 
 
 0.0086* 
(0.0040) 
 0.0100* 
(0.0040) 
 0.0087* 
(0.0042) 
Net Income t-1 
 
-3.20E-06 
(6.82E-05) 
-8.15E-06 
(3.88E-05) 
 3.73E-05 
(5.84E-05) 
Revenues t-1 
 
-3.61E-05** 
(1.28E-05) 
-5.08E-05*** 
(1.33E-05) 
-3.66E-05** 
(1.32E-05) 
Presample Mean t-1 
 
 0.0393** 
(0.0137) 
 0.0394* 
(0.0178) 
 0.0469** 
(0.0147) 
Presample Dummy t-1 
 
-0.0623 
(0.2749) 
 1.2789*** 
(0.2935) 
 0.0276 
(0.2806) 
Knowledge Stockt-1 
 
 0.0098*** 
(0.0017) 
  0.0094*** 
(0.0017) 
R&D Expenditures t-1 
 
 2.12E-03*** 
(6.31E-04) 
 1.93E-03*** 
(3.58E-04) 
 1.97E-03*** 
(5.32E-04) 
R&D Expenditures squared t-1 
 
-9.52E-07*** 
(2.56E-07) 
-5.57E-07*** 
(1.25E-07) 
-8.60E-07*** 
(2.07E-07) 
R&D External t-1 
 
 0.6121** 
(0.2191) 
  
R&D Expenditures* 
R&D External t-1 
-1.22E-03* 
(5.64E-04) 
  
R&D Expenditures Squared*  
R&D External t-1 
 6.28E-07* 
(2.67E-07) 
  
R&D Alliancet-1 
 
  0.1120** 
(0.0390) 
 0.1964*** 
(0.0561) 
R&D Expenditures* 
R&D Alliancet-1 
 -2.05E-04** 
(6.15E-05) 
-3.02E-04* 
(1.17E-04) 
R&D Expenditures Squared*  
R&D Alliancet-1 
  9.11E-08*** 
(2.35E-08) 
 1.27E-07** 
(4.68E-08) 
R&D Acquisitiont-1 
 
  0.1076 
(0.0736) 
 0.3139** 
(0.0995) 
R&D Expenditures* 
R&D Acquisition t-1 
 -2.04E-04† 
(1.19E-04) 
-5.56E-04*** 
(1.64E-04) 
R&D Expenditures Squared*  
R&D Acquisitiont-1 
  7.88E-08† 
(4.74E-08) 
 2.03E-07** 
(6.73E-08) 
N  1139  1125  1139 
Log Likelihood  -2247.5532  
Chi Square   360.39***  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are included but not shown. The fixed-effects (FE) 
specification eliminates firms who never patent, thereby reducing the effective sample to 1125 firm-year observations. 
Two tailed-tests significant at: † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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